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ABSTRACT
Decision procedures aggregating the preferences of multiple agents can produce cycles
and hence outcomes which have been described heuristically as ‘chaotic’. We make this
description precise by constructing an explicit dynamical system from the agents’ pref-
erences and a voting rule. The dynamics form a one dimensional statistical mechanics
model; this suggests the use of the topological entropy to quantify the complexity of the
system. We formulate natural political/social questions about the expected complexity of
a voting rule and degree of cohesion/diversity among agents in terms of random matrix
models—ensembles of statistical mechanics models—and compute quantitative answers in
some representative cases.
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The input for many mathematical models of social, political and economic systems
includes a list of preference orders, one for each agent in the model. These preferences
are aggregated, respectively, by some social welfare function, or voting rule, or market
mechanism. More than 200 years ago, however, Condorcet recognized potential problems
with voting rules, namely that aggregation might produce cycles [1]. For example, suppose
that there are three alternatives {a, b, c} and three voters rank them in the orders a > b > c
(by which we mean a is preferred to b which is preferred to c), b > c > a, and c > a > b.
Given a choice between b and a, a 2:1 majority prefers a; if they are offered the opportunity
to switch from a to c, again a majority will vote to do so; finally, a majority also prefers b
to c, completing a cycle.
While this example may seem contrived, Arrow’s celebrated theorem [2] states that
among an apparently reasonable set of voting rules, the only ones which do not encounter
peculiarities of this sort for some profile (list of preference orders) are dictatorial, i.e.,
they depend only on the preference order of a single, specified, voter. Taking the example
seriously then, we conceive it as describing a sequence of states (the successive preferred
alternatives), a situation which is naturally modelled as a dynamical system. A similar
perspective was originally suggested by Saari [3]; in this letter, motivated in part by
potential applications to autonomous machines [4] choosing new states from a sequence of
alternatives, rather than analyzing the situation by analogy with dynamical systems, we
construct an explicit map from a profile and voting rule to a discrete dynamical system.
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Fig. 1. The weak tournaments corresponding to
majority rule on the profiles p1 = (a > b > c, b >
c > a, c > a > b) and p2 = (a > b > c, c > b >
a, c > a > b). We suppress the edges connecting
each vertex to itself. Note the nontrivial cycle in
the graph fp1 (on the left).
The usual model for a preference or-
der is a relation, denoted ≥, which is com-
plete (for all pairs of alternatives a ≥ b
or b ≥ a) and transitive (if a ≥ b and
b ≥ c then a ≥ c) [2]. When a ≥ b and
b ≥ a, the voter with this preference order
is indifferent between a and b; when only
a ≥ b, say, the voter strictly prefers a and
we write a > b. We consider aggregation
formalized by maps f from preference pro-
files p to directed graphs fp. A directed
edge a← b in fp indicates that for profile
p the map f chooses alternative a over
alternative b. We call f a voting rule if
for all profiles p, fp is complete or a weak
tournament [5] (for all pairs of alternatives a← b or b← a in fp) and Pareto or unanimous
(if a ≥ b in each preference order in p then a← b in fp). Notice that for every alternative
x, since x ≥ x in every preference order, x ← x in fp for every profile and voting rule.
The weak tournament for the profile and majority voting rule of the example in the first
paragraph is shown on the left in Fig. 1; we omit the edges connecting each vertex to itself.
We have motivated the introduction of weak tournaments by an example of what
is essentially an amendment procedure [6], i.e., successive pairwise votes between a new
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alternative and the current one. Notice that this definition of voting rule is actually a
generalization of the more familiar one which requires the outcome to be a preference order
on the set of alternatives. Such an outcome corresponds to fp being transitive as well as
complete and Pareto. But Arrow’s theorem [2], for example, says that a broader definition
is necessary if we forbid dictatorial rules and impose the condition of independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA)—that the relation between a and b in fp depend only on
the relations of a and b in the preference orders in p [7]. In fact, the broader definition
applies equally well to voters whose pairwise preferences are not necessarily consistent,
i.e., transitive.
The directed graph which is the image of a voting rule f on a specific profile p de-
fines a symbolic dynamical system: Suppose the voters are presented with a sequence
of alternatives—an agenda, by extension of the usual meaning to allow arbitrarily long
sequences. The results of successive pairwise votes between the new alternative and the
current one form a sequence of symbols representing the chosen alternatives. The possi-
ble sequences are exactly the directed paths in fp, e.g., for the first example in Fig. 1,
baacbbaccc . . . are the first 10 symbols of an admissible sequence/path in fp1 . For contrast,
examine the second example in Fig. 1, obtained by applying the same majority voting
rule to the profile p2 = (a > b > c, c > b > a, c > a > b). An admissible sequence/path
in fp2 can start the same way: baaccccccc . . ., but once alternative c is chosen, no other
alternative can beat it; the sequence terminates with a string of c s. It is clear that the
space of admissible paths on fp completely characterizes a profile/voting rule pair. This
space, together with the shift map (deletion of the first symbol of a sequence) forms the
promised dynamical system—a (one-sided) subshift of finite type [8].
In Fig. 1, the first set of admissible sequences seems more interesting/complex than
the second. To quantify this perception we enumerate the admissible sequences which
are periodic with period N : Define the transition matrix Fp by (Fp)ab = 1 if a ← b in
fp and (Fp)ab = 0 otherwise. Then the number of N -periodic sequences is the trace of
FNp . It is easy to check, for example, that 6 = TrF
3
p1 > TrF
3
p2 = 3; more generally
TrFNp = λ
N
1 + · · ·+ λ
N
k when there are k alternatives and λi are the eigenvalues of Fp.
The thermodynamic formalism [9] provides a physical description of symbolic dynam-
ical systems. Observe that
TrFNp = lim
T→0
∑
σ∈AN
e−Efp (σ)/T =: lim
T→0
ZN [fp, T ], (1)
where A is the set of alternatives and, with the convention that σN+1 ≡ σ1,
Efp(σ) :=
N∑
i=1
1− (Fp)σi+1σi . (2)
ZN [fp, T ] is the partition function for a statistical mechanics model on the lattice ZN
where the set of states is A and the energy Efp(σ) of a configuration σ ∈ A
N is the
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sum of contributions from adjacent states: 0 if σi+1 ← σi in fp and 1 otherwise. The zero
temperature T → 0 limit in Eq. 1 eliminates the contributions from all but the ground state
configurations, so the number of ground states (and hence ZN [fp, 0]) is the same as the
number of admissible N -periodic sequences. From this perspective it is particularly natural
to consider the free energy density (the average energy per lattice site) or equivalently, the
topological entropy [10]:
S[fp] := lim
N→∞
1
N
logZN [fp, 0]. (3)
Inserting Eq. 1 into Eq. 3 we see that S[fp] = logΛfp , where Λfp is the spectral radius of
Fp, namely its largest eigenvalue.
The topological entropy measures the degree of mixing of the dynamical system de-
fined by fp. When the entropy is positive the dynamical system is chaotic and exhibits the
familiar features of chaos: topological transitivity, sensitive dependence on initial condi-
tions, and a dense set of periodic points [11]. For the examples of Fig. 1, we can compute
S[fp1 ] = 1 (using logarithms in base 2) and S[fp2 ] = 0, which suggests that the presence
of a cycle in fp makes the dynamical system chaotic. This is true in general:
PROPOSITION. The dynamical system defined by a complete directed graph has positive
topological entropy iff the graph contains a nontrivial cycle.
Proof. If the directed graph has no nontrivial cycle there is some ordering of the vertices
for which the associated transition matrix is upper triangular. Hence all its eigenvalues
are 1, so the topological entropy vanishes. Conversely, suppose there is a cycle of length
l > 1 in the directed graph. Considering only those paths which lie entirely on the cycle,
at each vertex of the cycle such a path may stay there or continue to the next vertex.
Starting from any vertex on the l-cycle, then, there are 2N such paths of length N , which
may require at most l− 1 additional steps to close. Thus S ≥ limN→∞(log l2
N )/N = 1.
a d
c
b
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Fig. 2. The weak tournaments corresponding to
majority rule on the profiles p3 = (b > c > a >
d, c > d > a > b, d > b > c > a) and p4 = (b >
c > a > d, c > a > d > b, d > b > c > a). On
the left, fp3 contains a 3-cycle; on the right, fp4
contains a 4-cycle.
Since Arrow’s theorem [2] guarantees
the existence of cycles for any nondictato-
rial IIA voting rule and some profile on at
least three alternatives, positivity of the
topological entropy demonstrates the con-
nection between Arrow’s theorem, cycles
and chaos hinted at by the ‘chaos’ theo-
rems in spatial voting models [12] as well
as by Saari’s suggestive analogies [3]. We
therefore propose to use the topological
entropy as a measure of the complexity
of a profile/voting rule pair. It identi-
fies the associated dynamical system as
chaotic or nonchaotic and quantifies ‘how
chaotic’ the system is. Consider the pair
of profiles p3 = (b > c > a > d, c > d > a > b, d > b > c > a) and p4 = (b > c > a >
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d, c > a > d > b, d > b > c > a) for three voters and four alternatives. Majority rule gives
the weak tournaments shown in Fig. 2, both of which contain cycles and so define chaotic
dynamical systems. Notice that fp3 contains a 3-cycle while fp4 contains a 4-cycle; the
entropies differ correspondingly [13]:
S[fp3 ] = 1 and S[fp4 ] ≈ 1.260. (4)
Formulating the system as a statistical mechanics model focusses our attention on
the energy functional: The energy of a configuration is defined (Eq. 2) by a matrix with
entries 1− (Fp)ab. As the profile p or the voting rule f changes, this matrix can change.
For a (probabilistic) ensemble of possible matrices the partition function (Eq. 1) defines a
random matrix model [14].
The first type of ensemble we consider is generated by a random distribution of profiles.
For a given voting rule, the statistical mechanics model defined by ZN [fp, T ] will be present
in the ensemble with probability proportional to the number of profiles with the same image
under f . For example, again consider the situation of majority voting on three alternatives.
There are (3!)3 profiles for three voters with strict preferences, out of which 2 · 3! map to a
weak tournament with a cycle as in fp1 . Thus for a random ensemble over these profiles,
the average entropy for majority rule is 1· 1
18
+0· 17
18
= 1
18
≈ 0.056. In the limit of an infinite
(odd) number of voters, we can use a result originally obtained by Guilbaud [15], that the
probability of a cycle is 14 −
3
2pi arcsin
1
3 , to find that the average entropy for majority rule
on three alternatives goes up to approximately 0.088.
Similarly, for four alternatives, there are (4!)3 strict profiles for three voters, out of
which 1632 map to a weak tournament with a 3-cycle as in fp3 and 720 map to a weak
tournament with a 4-cycle as in fp4 . Weighting the entropies in Eq. 4 accordingly, over
this ensemble of profiles the average entropy for majority rule is approximately 0.184. In
the limit of an infinite (odd) number of voters, we can use a result of May and of Fishburn
[16] that the probability of a Condorcet winner [13] is 12 +
3
pi arcsin
1
3 , together with the
result of Gehrlein and Fishburn [17] that the probability that there is no nontrivial cycle
is
3
8
+
6
pi2
∫ 1/3
0
arccos[−x/(1− 2x2)]
(1− x2)1/2
dx,
to find that the average entropy for majority rule on four alternatives goes up to approxi-
mately 0.391.
We can also consider the same ensembles of profiles aggregated by other voting rules.
The Borda count [18], for example, assigns weights of n − 1, n − 2, . . ., 0 to each voter’s
first, second, . . ., last preferences, respectively, sums the weights of each alternative, and
ranks the n alternatives accordingly. Since there is now the possibility of alternatives with
equal ranks, even though the resulting weak tournament is transitive, it may still contain
cycles [19]. For three voters the average entropy for the Borda count on three alternatives
is log 3 · 118 + 1 ·
1
6 ≈ 0.255, while on four alternatives it is log 3 ·
1
18 + 1 ·
37
96 ≈ 0.473.
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For comparison, we may use the Copeland method [20] to make the weak tournaments
obtained by majority rule transitive: assign each alternative a weight which is the number
of incoming minus the number of outgoing edges and rank the alternatives accordingly.
For three voters the average entropy of the Copeland method on three alternatives is
log 3 · 118 ≈ 0.088, while on four alternatives it is log 3 ·
17
144 + 1 ·
5
96 ≈ 0.239, each of which,
although higher than for majority rule, is lower than the corresponding average entropy
for the Borda count.
The second type of ensemble is generated by a random distribution of voting rules.
We consider, for example, a uniform distribution of rules which satisfy IIA and have image
in the set of strict tournaments. (Strict tournaments are weak tournaments with exactly
one edge between every pair of vertices.) Each such voting rule is defined by its images
on the profiles restricted to all pairs of alternatives. For a pair of alternatives there are
2n possibilities for the restriction of a profile of n strict preferences. The voting rule maps
each of these to an edge directed one of two ways between these alternatives in a strict
tournament. Since voting rules are Pareto, the two unanimous restricted profiles have fixed
images, but the remaining 2n − 2 may be mapped, independently, to either directed edge.
Thus, if there are k alternatives, there are 2(2
n−2)(k2) possible IIA voting rules for n voters.
Although this forms a huge ensemble of maps f , given a profile p, it is straighforward to
determine with what probability each statistical mechanics model ZN [fp, T ] occurs in the
ensemble.
For example, consider the profile p5 = (c > a > b > d, d > a > c > b, a > c > d > b).
Restricted to {a, b} or to {b, c} this profile is unanimous, so every voting rule, being Pareto,
must map p5 to a strict tournament with the edges a← b and c← b. The other pairwise
restrictions, however, are not unanimous. Since we are considering an ensemble of IIA
voting rules, this means that a ← c (or c ← a), a ← d (or d ← a), b ← d (or d ← b),
and c ← d (or d ← c) are independent events. Furthermore, since the voting rules in
this ensemble map profiles to strict tournaments, each of the 16 resulting possibilities
has probability 116 . No further analysis of the ensemble is necessary; we can immediately
observe that with with probability 316 the strict tournament to which p5 maps has a 4-
cycle (like fp4), with probability
5
16
it has a 3-cycle (like fp3), and with probability
1
2
it is
transitive. Thus, using the entropies in Eq. 4, the average entropy for p5 over the ensemble
of strict IIA voting rules is approximately 1.260 · 3
16
+ 1 · 5
16
≈ 0.549. We can compare
this to the average entropy for p3 or p4 over the same ensemble. Each of these profiles
is only unanimous upon restriction to {a, c}; the consequent probabilities for a 4-cycle, a
3-cycle, and transitivity are 932 ,
11
32 , and
3
8 , respectively, leading to a larger average entropy
of approximately 0.698.
This shows that the average entropy over an ensemble of voting rules is a plausible
measure of the cohesion or diversity in a society [21], as described by a profile: When the
number of pairs on which the profile is unanimous decreases, the average entropy increases.
Furthermore, it is sensitive to which pairs the voters rank consistently. It is clear that for
this IIA ensemble, unanimity on two disjoint pairs, e.g., {a, c} and {b, d}, does not reduce
the entropy from the value found for p3 and p4.
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Taking a statistical mechanics approach to a general problem in social dynamics
[1,2,6,12,21,22]—iterated preference aggregation—we have been led to the topological en-
tropy as a quantitative measure of the complexity of profile/voting rule pairs. Unlike
traditional approaches which have concentrated merely on the existence (or not) of cycles,
use of this quantitative measure allows comparison between systems differing even in num-
ber of voters or alternatives. Furthermore, we have constructed an annealed random matrix
model for voting and considered ensembles corresponding to two natural social/political
questions: What level of complexity can we expect from a given voting rule? How cohe-
sive/diverse is the system relative to some collection of voting rules? The first question
has been addressed in previous work by evaluating the probabilities for the existence of a
Condorcet winner or of a nontrivial cycle [15,16,17,23]. Such probabilities are inputs into
our calculations of the average entropy for a given ensemble of profiles and voting rule.
Our approach to the second question is a strong generalization of the usual analysis of the
(non)existence of a cycle for a single voting rule. Not only does the topological entropy
provide for quantitative answers to these questions, it also makes precise the connection
between the existence of cycles and chaos. Increasing the number of autonomous agents or
the number of alternatives increases the complexity of the system; chaos can be reduced or
avoided only by changing [23] or severely restricting [2,6,21] the class of agent preferences
and/or aggregation rules.
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